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11 Taxation of the Financial 
Services Industry
Martin F. Grace and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
FINANCIAL TAXATION
This chapter addresses the taxation of Ohio’s financial institutions under 
the special corporate franchise tax for banks and other financial institutions. 
This tax applies to corporations conducting certain banking activities within 
Ohio, and is a tax on net worth. The dealers in intangibles tax will also be 
discussed in this chapter, although separately. This also is a net worth tax on 
stock brokers and dealers, mortgage brokers, bullion dealers, and finance 
and loan companies.
Composition and relative importance. Approximately 87,000 persons are 
employed in the banking sector in Ohio. This is approximately the same 
number as are employed in the insurance industry, the m otor vehicle m anu­
facturing industry, o r the primary metal manufacturing industry. Banks and 
savings and loan com panies contributed approximately $158 million to the 
state treasury in 1992, as shown in Table 11-1. The Ohio banking industry, 
for regulatory and historical reasons, is divided into banks, savings and 
loans, and other credit corporations. From Table 11-1 we see that the banks 
outnumber the savings and loans, and that they pay about three times more 
in taxes. In addition, the largest tax-paying banks and savings and loans 
(those with liabilities over $1,000,000) contribute approximately 60 percent 
of the corporate franchise tax on financial institutions.
Table 11-2 shows the relative im portance of the financial institutions tax
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TABLE 11-1 
D istribution of Liability by Size and Type of 
Taxpayer for 1992
Num ber of Corporations Tax Liability by Type ($)
Tax Liability Banks S&Ls O th rr Banks S&Ls Other Total
0  - 10.000 14 18 22 34.259 18.676 26.332 79.267
10.001 - 50.000 60 65 5 1,774.054 2.147.622 137.753 4,059.429
50.001 - 100.000 65 66 4 4.843.829 4.633.539 312.360 9.789.728
100.001 - 200.000 52 34 2 7.533.448 4,896.960 352.443 12.782.851
200.001 - 500.000 50 32 0 15.439.834 9.425.203 0 24.865.037
500.001 - 1.000.000 13 6 0 7.920.016 4.028.768 0 11.948.784
1.000.001 + 22 7 0 80.913.385 13.473.730 0 94.387.115
Total 276 228 33 118,458.825 38.624.498 828,888 157.912.211
TABLE 11-2
Financial Institu tions Tax as a Percent of C orporation Taxes
Tax Revenues Collected
Financial Institutions Tax
Percentage of Total 
Corporation Taxes*
1989 $130,125,260 10.92%
1990 $142,896,321 12.85
1991 $147,271,175 13.46
1992 $157,912,211 14.83
Source: Department o f Revenue Annual Reports (various years).
•Includes general corporation taxes, financial institutions tax, and insurance taxes.
relative to  all taxes paid by corporations, banks, and insurance companies 
for som e recent years. Since 1989 the percentage represented by the tax on 
financial institutions in the total o f corporate franchise taxes has increased 
from  approxim ately 11 percent to almost 15 percent. This reflects the fact 
tha t the net worth of these institutions has increased over the time period 
faster than  the alternative bases o f  net income and net worth for general 
co rpora te  taxpayers.
Figure 11-1 shows the relative changes in the paym ent of the financial in­
stitu tions tax during the last decade. The left axis shows the percentage of 
taxes paid by banks since 1983. This increased approximately 10 percent, 
from  76 percent in 1983 to 86 percent in 1986, and has decreased just over 
10 percen t from the 1986 peak. Correspondingly, savings and loans (repre-
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FIGURE 11-1. Percentage o f  tax receipts by type of financial institution.
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sented on the right axis) behaved in an opposite manner during the decade. 
This change was the result of two forces. First, there was a change in the tax 
rate. Prior to 1986 savings and loans paid a rate of 21.47 mills on their net 
worth, while o ther financial institutions paid a lesser rate of 16.54 mills. As 
S&Ls recovered from their financial difficulties in the middle 1980s, their 
contribution to tax revenues also increased.
The income elasticity of the corporate franchise tax on financial institu­
tions is shown in Figure 11-2. The elasticity provides information concern­
ing the tax’s relative responsiveness to income in the state. From the figure 
we see that the income elasticity was relatively constant (but with a tendency 
to decrease) from 1986 to 1989. However, the elasticity has been very un­
stable from 1989 to  1991. But during the entire period the elasticity re­
mained over one. This means that the corporate franchise tax on financial 
institutions has been growing more than proportionally with income in the 
state.
STR U C TU R E OF THE BANK TAX 
H i s t o r y  o f  B a n k  T a x a t i o n
State taxation o f banks has a long and colorful history, in part, because of 
Constitutional restrictions on the states’ ability to tax federal banks and be­
cause of explicit Congressional restrictions on the taxation of federally char­
tered banks.1 The Suprem e Court in McCulloch v. Maryland2 held that states 
could not tax national banks using any method save a real property or bank 
share tax. In the N ational Bank Act of 1864,3 Congress specified that states 
could not tax the real property of a bank at a rate higher than that on other 
property, and that a bank share tax could not be any higher than the rate on
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FIGURE 11-2. Financial institutions income tax elasticity.
any o ther “moneyed capital.” Because of these restrictions states limited 
the tax on state chartered banks, so that the sta tes’ banks were not placed at 
a com petitive disadvantage.
T he courts in terpreted  the maximum share tax to be no higher than the 
rate  im posed on o ther corporations involved in banking or the rate imposed 
on the intangible personal property of individuals involved in banking. The 
la tter in terpretation , according to Fox, required states to impose taxes on a 
wide range o f intangible property.
O ver time, as states a ttem pted to  raise revenue from the banking indus­
try, the rates increased relative to  o ther forms of intangible personal prop­
erty. This led to litigation, as the banking industry claimed it was being taxed 
m ore heavily than o ther “moneyed capital.” Congress again acted, this time 
to  define taxes that did not discrim inate against banks and that could raise 
revenue from  the banking industry. The legislation defined “other moneyed 
capita l” sufficiently narrowly to restrict the potential for bank taxes to be de­
term ined as discriminatory. The legislation also allowed for the option of 
taxing banks based on net income at a rate not to exceed that on other cor­
porations, and a tax on dividends received by shareholders at a rate no 
h igher than tha t on net income from other m onied capital. Because these 
taxes would generate  less revenue than the share tax already being employed 
in m ost states, and as income from federal, state, and local securities was ex­
em pt from  taxation under the law, Congress enacted a third option. This op­
tion was an excise tax where net income from all sources was allowed as the 
tax base.
A fter this legislation, there were still problem s with discrimination. The 
m ajor issue was the set o f taxes that should be used to com pare tax liabili­
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ties for banks and o ther corporations. Banks paid only the franchise tax, 
while all o ther corporations paid a series of taxes, thus the states gradually 
increased the tax rate on the banking industry so as to equalize the burden. 
Congress, in 1969, enacted a law that would become effective in 1976, stat­
ing that for the purpose of state or federal tax law, a national bank would be 
treated as a state bank.
This law brought about two significant changes in federal tax policy re­
garding banks. First, as long as states do not discriminate against national 
banks, they can impose any type of tax on banks within their jurisdiction. 
Second, the com parison, for purposes of determining whether discrimina­
tion exists, is to com pare taxes on national banks versus taxes on state banks. 
This contrasts with the previous m ethod of comparing bank taxes to non­
bank taxes.
However, there is one remaining limitation on the states’ tax power on 
the banking industry. Securities of the United States government are exempt 
from taxation by a state, except when it is imposed as part of a nondiscrimi- 
natory franchise tax or some other non-income tax imposed on a corpora­
tion or as part of a tax imposed on an estate. Thus, the total income of a 
bank, including interest from federal securities, may be in the tax base as 
long as the state tax is a franchise tax. The interest cannot be taxed as part 
of a corporate income tax. This is because a franchise tax is levied on a cor­
poration as a tax on the privilege of doing business in a state, not as a direct 
assessment on the income earned. In contrast, a corporate income tax is a 
direct assessment against corporate income.
O h io ’s A p p r o a c h  t o  B a n k  T a x a t io n
Recent history and present tax. Ohio taxes its financial institutions under 
the Corporate Franchise Tax, but it uses only the net worth component of 
the tax. Thus, the problem s of the net worth components from the general 
corporate franchise tax are applicable to the banking industry. Ohio adopted 
this approach in 1981, after repealing the previous franchise tax exemption 
for financial institutions. The first rate imposed was 6.5 mills, for tax years 
1982 and 1983. In 1983 the rates were increased so that banks were taxed at 
15 mills on their net worth, saving and loans were taxed at 21.47, and other 
financial institutions were taxed at 16.54 percent of their net worth. C ur­
rently the tax is 15 mills on net worth for all financial institutions. This tax is 
similar to the general corporation tax, except for the fact that there is no in­
come tax com ponent, only a net worth component.
Tax base. The tax base for the financial institutions net worth tax is the ap­
portioned net value of the stock of the corporation, defined similarly to the 
net value of stock for non-financial institutions, i.e., the capital stock (less 
treasury stock), ownership interest of depositors, retained earnings and
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additional paid in capital, and deferred taxes and reserves. This is the total 
net worth. From  this am ount certain exempted assets, such as goodwill, 
abandoned property, exem pt property, agricultural property, property set 
aside for R& D, and appreciation, are subtracted to  obtain the net taxable 
value of the stock.
Computation o f  the tax. To obtain the tax base or value of the financial in­
stitu tion’s property, one multiplies the “Ohio ratio” by the tax base. The 
O hio ratio is the ratio of the “activity” of the corporation done within Ohio 
to the “activity” o f the company done everywhere. As in the case of the gen­
eral corporation net worth ratio, the apportionm ent formula for financial in­
stitutions is based upon property and business done in Ohio, and that is 
com pared to  the property and business done everywhere. This can be seen 
in the following allocator:
. 1 Property within Ohio 1 Business within Ohio
Ohio Ratio = --------— ----------------  + ------------------------------
2 Property Everywhere 2 Business Everywhere
Tax rate. The tax rate is currently 15 mills and it is multiplied by the tax­
able value to obtain the tax due on the net worth basis. Note that this tax rate 
is approximately three times the tax rate for the net worth tax on non-finan- 
cial corporations.
Credits. Savings and loan associations are allowed a credit against their 
tax due equal to the am ount of the annual assessment paid by the S&L to 
the state division of Savings and Loan Associations, less the am ount paid to 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (or if not insured by 
the FSLIC, the am ount it would pay if it was insured). In addition to this 
credit financial institutions (like other corporations) can currently obtain 
credits for qualifying new investment in property used in manufacturing, ex­
port sale credits, enterprise zone day care credits, and enterprise zone train­
ing credits.4 In 1992, the new investment credit am ounted to $104,729 and 
the credit for S&L fees was $930,680. For the financial services industry, 
credits have little impact on overall final tax liability.
C o m p a r is o n  w it h  O t h e r  S t a t e s
Table 11-3 shows the financial institution tax policies for Ohio, its neigh­
bors, and certain im portant banking states. Nationwide, some states employ 
share taxes, and 40 have a franchise tax. Some states use more than one of 
these taxes, while three states (Louisiana, Nevada, and Wyoming) have no 
state tax on banking.
As seen from the table, im portant banking states and O hio’s neighbors 
are likely to use a franchise tax based on income. This is in contrast to Ohio’s 
net worth franchise tax. There is a mixed treatm ent of the taxation of fed­
eral and state securities; some, like Ohio, exempt all government security in-
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TABLE 11-3
State Taxation of Banks by Im portant Banking States 
and O hio’s Neighbors
Interest from Government 
Securities Taxable
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Rate
Franchise 
Tax Rate Share Tax 
Rate
Apportion 
Bank Tax
Liability
Franchise 
Tax based 
on Income Federal
Own
States'
Other
States'
California(l) 0.000 11.107 0.000 y y y y y
Delaware 0.000 8.700 0 000 0 y y y y
Fk>rida(2X3) 0.000 5.500 0.150 y y y y y
Illinois(3) 7.300 0.250 0.000 y n n y y
Indiana 0 0 0 0 8.500 0.250 y y n n y
Kentucky(2X4) 0.000 0.001 0.950 y n n n y
Michigan(S) 0.000 0.000 0.000 y na n n y
Minnesota 0.000 9.800 0.000 y y y y y
New Jeney(3) 0.000 9.375 0.000 y y y y y
New York(3) 0.000 10.350 0.000 y y y y y
North Carolina 7.905 0.003 0.000 y D y y y
Ohio(2)(3) 0.000 1.500 0.000 y n ■ ■
Pennsylvania 00 0 0 0.000 1.250 ■ na • 0 n
South
Dakou(3)
0.000 6.000 0.000 y y y y y
Source: Fox (1993).
Notes: (1) California levies a SSO franchise tax
(2) Levies an inungible tax
(3) Minimum tax is levied if no income is earned.
(4) The tax listed as a franchise tax is an intangible lax on deposits. There is also an intangibles tax 
of 1.3% on accounts receivables, notes bonds, credits, etc..
(5) Michigan tax is a 2.3% ux  on the adjusted tax base
terest, and some, like New York, tax all income from government securities.
Table 11-4 shows the apportionm ent factors for financial institutions for 
a num ber o f selected states. Most states listed in the table allocate net in­
come, and for the most part they use one of the traditional apportionm ent 
formulas based on sales, property, and payroll factors. The apportionm ent 
form ula can be ra ther complicated in some states, such as New York, which 
uses the ratio of in-state to total receipts, payroll (with a weight of 80 p er­
cent), and includes deposits.
D e a l e r s  in  I n t a n g ib l e s  T a x
Ohio taxes its dealers in intangibles (stock brokers and dealers, bullion
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TABLE 11-4
A pportionm ent Factors for Financial Institutions
State Financial Institutions Weighted Equally?
Ohio Net Worth Only - Business Done and Property N/A
Illinois Business Income N/A
Indiana Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
Iowa Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
Kentucky Gross Receipts or Sales; Payroll; Outstanding Loan Balance N/A
Michigan Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
Minnesota Tangible Property (includes Intangibles): Payroll; Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
Missouri Tangible Property; Gross Receipts or Sales; Payroll Yes
Wisconsin Gross Receipts or Sales; Payroll Yes
California Tangible Property (includes Intangibles): Gross Receigpsor Sales; Payroll N/A
Colorado Tangible Property; Gross Receipts or Sales; Payroll N/A
Rorida Tangible Property (includes Intangible. Gross Receipts or Sales; Payroll N/A
Georgia Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
New Jersey Tangible Property; Gross Receipts of Sales; Payroll N/A
New York For Banks Only. Arithmetic Avg. Of Instate to Total Receipts; 80% of 
Payroll (except General Executive Officers); and Deposits
N/A
North Carolina Gross Receipts or Sales N/A
Pennsylvania Value o f Shares N/R
Source: 1993 Multistale Corporate Tax Guide.
dealers, m ortgage brokers, and finance and loan com panies) based on the 
value of the firm. This is very much like the net worth tax portion of the cor­
poration  franchise tax.
The dealers in intangible tax is a relatively small tax, raising approxi­
m ately $11 million in 1992. This represents about 1.75 percent o f the corpo­
rate  franchise receipts. In addition, the dealers in intangible tax is a unique 
tax am ong the states, as no o ther state employs this m ethod for taxing deal­
ers in intangibles.
The dealers in intangible tax was first enacted in 1931 at a rate of five 
mills. This ra te  did not change until 1971, when the ra te  was increased to six 
mills. In 1988 the rate was raised again, by two mills. Thus, the current rate 
is eight mills, which is assessed against net value. Currently, the receipts of 
the tax are divided betw een the general revenue fund (three mills) and the 
C ounty Undivided Local G overnm ent Fund (five mills).
T he dealers in intangible tax is, m ore specifically a tax on the shares of a 
corporation or partnership  dealing in intangibles.5 Firms are thus assessed 
on the value of capital, surplus, and undivided profits. Shares owned by 
financial institutions, dom estic insurance companies, o ther dealers in intan­
gibles, as well as U nited States G overnm ent securities, are excluded from
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the calculation of net worth. Furtherm ore, if the dealer is engaged in a m ul­
tistate operation, the value is apportioned based on the net worth appor­
tionment factor employed in the corporate franchise tax.6
The law has some im portant exemptions which provide loopholes for cer­
tain types of firms. Companies covered by O.R.C. § 5725 (dealers in in tan­
gibles, domestic insurers and financial institutions) can avoid the intangible 
tax under National City Bank o f  Cleveland v. Porterfield.7 In this case the Ohio 
Supreme C ourt stated that shares of stock in companies covered under 
§5725 are not subject to the intangible property tax because the taxes they 
pay under that statu te are in lieu of all o ther taxes. Thus, a large dealer in in­
tangibles can engage in tax planning by rearranging the dealer in intangibles 
portion of its business as a subsidiary owned by a bank or insurance com ­
pany. This can be a revenue loser for the state, especially if the dealer in in­
tangibles is large relative to the parent.
O ne sign of the potential for tax avoidance is shown by the fact that since 
the rate was increased to 8 mills in 1988, the receipts in each subsequent 
year have not m atched the initial year’s total receipts. This is shown in Table
11-5. This is im portant, because net worth generally increases over time and 
thus one would expect the revenues to increase or at least be stable. This 
should translate into increasing or stable tax revenues.
ISSUES A N D  OPTIONS FOR REFORM  
IN THE N O N -IN SUR AN CE  
FINANCIAL SERVICE INDUSTRY
C h a n g e  t h e  D e f in it io n  o f  a
F in a n c ia l  I n s t it u t io n  t o  B e  M o r e  In c l u s iv e
O hio has a problem  with its definition of a financial institution subject to 
taxation under the financial institutions tax. This definition excludes a num ­
ber o f bank com petitors from taxation under the law. The definition of a 
taxable financial institution in Ohio is
[Every person who keeps an office or o ther place of busi­
ness in [Ohio] and engages in the business of receiving de­
posits, lending money, and buying or selling bullion, bills of 
exchange, notes, bonds, stocks, o r o ther evidence of in­
debtedness with a view to profit or is licensed as a small 
business investment company under the ‘Small Business 
Investm ent Act of 1958,’ . . .  o r is organized under the 
Federal Farm Credit A c t . .  ,8]
This law is based on an antiquated notion o f the banking business. As inter-
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TABLE 11-5 
D ealers in Intangible Tax Receipts over Time
Year Receipts in $ Millions
1986 6.9
1987 8.2
1988* 13.4
1989 12.3
1990 8.1
1991 11.6
1992 11.2
Source: Department of Taxation, Annual Report (various years).
*Year rate increased to 8 mills from 6 mills.
state banking has grown and as the non-bank financial industry has grown, 
the distinctions between depository banks and o ther financial service 
providers have disappeared. The statute requires that, among other things, 
a bank must accept deposits in Ohio before the tax can be placed on its ac­
tivities. Banks can lower their Ohio tax liability by producing financial ser­
vices outside the state and then selling them back to Ohio residents. They 
can accept deposits through the mail or by way of interbank electronic trans­
fers. This encourages all non-depository functions to  be sent out-of-state 
and results in revenue loss and potential job loss.9
T a x  B a n k s  a n d  O t h e r  F in a n c ia l  I n s t it u t io n s  
L ik e  G e n e r a l  C o r p o r a t io n s  w it h  a  F r a n c h is e  T a x
T here  are two issues here. The first is that different tax treatm ent leads 
to different tax burdens. This is a violation of horizontal equity. By taxing all 
financial corporations and general corporations in a similar m anner it is 
possible to increase the horizontal equity among com petitors or potential 
com petitors.
A  second issue that has potential ramifications for horizontal equity con­
cerns those banks owned by a holding company. Since the financial institu­
tions tax rate is approxim ately three times the rate for nonfinancial 
corporations, a bank owned by a holding company has an incentive to trans­
fer net worth to the parent, thus reducing the yield of the financial institu­
tions franchise tax. O f course, this transfer may be limited by regulatory 
capital requirem ents imposed as part of risk based capital rules imple­
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mented by federal regulators. This benefits large subsidiary banks which are 
part o f a holding company relative to  stand-alone banks.
Since all institutions pay federal tax, one could use the federal tax as a 
starting point and piggy-back on the federal definition of net income. This is 
precisely what is done in the non-financial area, and there are strong hori­
zontal equity reasons to treat all corporations as equally as possible. Using 
income balance sheet information for Ohio banks, from Sheshunoff Banks o f  
Ohio, 1993, we sim ulate the imposition of a net income tax. This simulation 
applied O hio’s curren t tax rate and definition of net income and assumed 
that all profits are apportional to Ohio. This resulted in a tax revenue of 
$133 million. This com pares to $173 million in tax revenue collected under 
the current tax. The difference, 23 percent, may be mitigated if Ohio were 
to adopt a unitary reporting approach and could be underestim ated if the 
banks apportioned profits to Ohio at a rate significantly less than 100 per­
cent. Further, to  the extent that there are taxpayer banks not reported by 
Sheshunoff, the figure could be under representing the actual yield of a net 
income tax as applied to banks.
E m p l o y  a n  A l t e r n a t iv e  M in im u m  T a x  t o  O f f s e t  t h e  
Lo s t  R e v e n u e  f r o m  E x e m p t in g  t h e  I n t e r e s t  o f  
Sta te  a n d  F e d e r a l  S e c u r it ie s
Banks traditionally hold a large percentage of government securities in 
their portfolios. Because of federal bank tax law, it is not possible to (1) tax 
these securities under an income tax or (2) tax these securities differentially 
from state securities under a franchise tax. If Ohio desires to  keep its own 
securities tax-free, then it is possible to employ an alternative minimum tax 
based on net worth to obtain the revenues lost from the exemption of secu­
rities. Thus, a bank corporation would pay an income tax on a base that ex­
cludes governm ent security income or an alternative minimum tax. If the 
bank’s income tax liability was less than a certain amount, then the bank 
would pay an alternative higher am ount. Ideally, this am ount would be cal­
culated to offset the losses from the exemption of the federal securities.
A quite different approach to this issue of exempt income is to do nothing. 
Banks and other financial institutions pay no income tax on exempt securities 
but they also earn lower interest income. Furthermore, all companies includ­
ing financial institutions, are free to invest in tax exempt securities.
E m p l o y  a  H ig h e r  R a t e  o n  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  F r a n c h is e  T a x
Yet another approach to the issue of banks are being exempt from the 
taxation of income generated by governm ent securities. Thus, one could ex-
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elude these from the tax base, but tax the bank at a higher rate than the gen­
eral corporation. One could calculate a rate that was consistent with the bur­
den placed on o ther (nonfinancial) corporations. California does this, as it 
taxes all non-financial corporations at a flat rate of 9.3 percent and taxes fi­
nancial corporations differentially at 11.107 percent.10 However, a tax on a 
financial institution’s capital is not ideal. This is because regulators desire in­
stitutions to  keep relatively large am ounts of capital for solvency purposes. 
The “safer” a com pany is the higher its net worth tax liability.
E l im in a t e  t h e  D e a l e r s  in  I n t a n g ib l e s  T a x
Because the dealers in intangibles tax is a relatively small revenue-raiser, 
and because it can be used to  avoid a potentially large am ount of tax, the ob­
vious option is to  repeal the dealers in intangibles tax and tax dealers in in­
tangibles like o ther corporations. This would increase horizontal equity and 
place all financial firms on a relatively similar tax basis. The repeal of the tax 
also would elim inate the need for organizational structural shenanigans to 
avoid the tax by dealers in intangibles. Changing to  an income tax would re­
duce their ability to avoid paying taxes and would shore up the tax base. An 
alternative and less drastic structural change that could be used instead of 
an income tax would be to merely repeal the in lieu o f  provisions of O.R.C. 
§ 5725.26 for dealers in intangibles. This would reduce the incentive to tax 
plan, but would not really address the horizontal treatm ent o f all financial 
service firms.
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